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Abstract
A long-standing question in social science is to what extent differences in management cause 
differences in firm performance. To investigate this we ran a management field experiment on 
large Indian textile firms. We provided free consulting on modern management practices to 
a randomly chosen set of treatment plants and compared their performance to the control 
plants. We find that adopting these management practices had three main effects. First, it 
raised average productivity by 11 per cent through improved quality and efficiency and reduced 
inventory. Second, it increased decentralization of decision making, as better information flow 
enabled owners to delegate more decisions to middle managers. Third, it increased the use of 
computers, necessitated by the data collection and analysis involved in modern management. 
Since these practices were profitable this raises the question of why firms had not adopted 
these before. Our results suggest that informational barriers were a primary factor in explaining 
this lack of adoption. Modern management is a technology that diffuses slowly between firms, 
with many Indian firms initially unaware of its existence or impact. Since competition was limited 
by constraints on firm entry and growth, badly managed firms were not rapidly driven from 
the market. 
JEL No. L2, M2, O14, O32, O33.
Keywords: management, organization, IT, productivity and India.
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I. Introduction
Economists have long puzzled over why there are such astonishing differences in productivity 
across both firms and countries. For example, US plants in homogeneous industries like cement, 
block-ice, white pan bread and oak flooring display 100 per cent productivity spreads between 
the 10th and 90th percentile (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008). 
A natural explanation for these productivity differences lies in variations in management 
practices. Indeed, the idea that ‘managerial technology’ affects the productivity of inputs goes 
back at least to Walker (1887) and is central to the Lucas (1978) model of firm size. Yet while 
management has long been emphasized by the media, business schools and policymakers, 
economists have typically been skeptical about its importance. 
One reason for skepticism is the belief that competition will drive badly managed firms out of 
the market. As a result any residual variations in management practices will reflect firms’ optimal 
responses to differing market conditions. For example, firms in developing countries may not 
adopt quality control systems because wages are so low that repairing defects is cheap. Hence, 
their management practices are not ‘bad’, but the optimal response to low wages. 
A second reason for this skepticism is the complexity of management, making it hard to 
measure.1 Recent work, however, has focused on specific management practices which can 
be measured, taught in business schools and recommended by consultants. Examples of 
these practices include key principles of Toyota’s ‘lean manufacturing’, such as quality control 
procedures, inventory management, and human resource management. A growing literature 
measures many such practices and finds large variations across establishments and a strong 
association between these practices and higher productivity and profitability.2 
This paper provides the first experimental evidence on the importance of management practices 
in large firms. The experiment takes large, multi-plant Indian textile firms and randomly allocates 
their plants to treatment and control groups. Treatment plants received five months of extensive 
management consulting from a large international consulting firm. This consulting diagnosed 
opportunities for improvement in a canonical set of management practices during the first month, 
followed by four months of intensive support for the implementation of these recommendations. 
The control plants received only the one month of diagnostic consulting. 
The treatment intervention led to significant improvements in quality, inventory and production output. 
The result was an increase in productivity of 11 per cent and an increase in annual profitability of 
about $230,000. Firms also spread these management improvements from their treatment plants 
to other plants they owned, providing revealed preference evidence on their beneficial impact.
Given these results, the natural question is why firms had not previously adopted these practices. 
Our evidence suggests that informational constraints were an important factor. Firms were often 
not aware of the existence of many modern management practices, like inventory norms and 
standard operating procedures, or did not appreciate how these could improve performance. 
For example, many firms claimed their quality was as good as other local firms and so did not 
need to introduce a quality control process.
We also find two other major impacts of better management practices. First, owners delegated 
greater decision making power over hiring, investment and pay to their plant managers. This 
happened in large part because the improved collection and dissemination of information that 
was part of the change process enabled owners to monitor their plant managers better. As a 
result, owners felt more comfortable delegating. 
1 Lucas (1978, p 511) notes that his model ‘does not say anything about the tasks performed by managers, other than whatever 
managers do, some do it better than others’.
2 See for example, Osterman (1994), Huselid and Becker (1996), MacDuffie (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1998), 
Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). A prominent early example is Pack (1987), which, like the 
present study, deals with textile firms in developing countries. In related work, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use a manager-firm 
matched panel and find that manager fixed effects matter for a range of corporate decisions. Lazear and Oyer (2009) and Bloom 
and Van Reenen (2010) provide extensive surveys.
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Second, the extensive data collection and processing requirements of modern management 
led to a rapid increase in computer use. For example, installing quality control systems requires 
firms to record individual quality defects and then analyze these by shift, loom, and design. 
So modern management appears to be a skill-biased technical change (SBTC), as increased 
computerization raises the demand for educated employees. A large literature has highlighted 
SBTC as a key factor increasing income inequality since the 1970s. Our experiment provides 
some evidence on the role of modern management in driving SBTC.3 
The major challenge of our experiment is the small cross-sectional sample size. We have 
data on only 28 plants across 17 firms. To address concerns over statistical inference in small 
samples we implement permutations tests that have exact finite sample size. We also exploit 
our large time series of around 100 weeks of data per plant by using estimators that rely on 
large T (rather than large N) asymptotics. We believe these approaches are useful for addressing 
sample concerns in our paper, and also potentially for other field experiments where the data 
has a small cross-section but long time series.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, there is the long literature showing large 
productivity differences across plants in dozens of countries. From the outset this literature has 
attributed much of these spreads to differences in management practices (Mundlak, 1961), but 
problems in measurement and identification have made this hard to confirm (Syverson, 2010). 
This productivity dispersion appears even larger in developing countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2005, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Despite this, there are still few experiments on productivity in 
firms (McKenzie, 2010a) and none involving large multi-plant firms.
Second, our paper builds on the literature on the management practices of firms. There has been 
a long debate between the ‘best-practice’ view that some management practices are universally 
good so that all firms would benefit from adopting these (Taylor, 1911) and the ‘contingency view’ 
that every firm is already adopting optimal practices but these differ firm by firm (eg, Woodward, 
1958). Much of the empirical literature trying to distinguish between these views has traditionally 
been case-study or survey based, making it hard to distinguish between different explanations 
and resulting in little consensus in the management literature.4 This paper provides experimental 
evidence that a core set of best practices do exist, at least in one industry.
Third, the paper links to the large theoretical literature on the organization of firms. These 
papers generally emphasize optimal decentralization as driven either by minimizing learning 
and information processing costs or by optimizing incentives.5 But the empirical evidence on 
decentralization is limited, focusing primarily on de-layering in large publicly traded US firms 
(Rajan and Wulf, 2006).
Fourth, the paper contributes to the literature on Information Technology (IT) and productivity. 
A growing body of work has examined the relationship between technology and productivity, 
emphasizing both the direct productivity impact of IT and also its complementarity with modern 
management and organizational practices (eg, Bresnahan et al. 2002 and Bartel et al. 2007). But 
again the evidence has focused on survey data rather than experimental data. Our experimental 
evidence suggests one route for computers to affect productivity is by facilitating better management 
practices, and this occurs simultaneously with the decentralization of decisions. 
Finally, recently a number of other field experiments in developing countries (for example Karlan 
and Valdivia 2010, Bruhn et al. 2010 and Drexler et al. 2010) have begun to estimate the impact 
of basic business training and advice in micro- and small enterprises. This research has found 
significant effects of some forms of training on performance in smaller firms, supporting our 
results on in larger firms. 
3 See, for example, the survey in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008).
4 See, for example, the surveys in Delery and Doty (1996) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2010).
5 See the recent reviews in Garicano and Van Zandt (2010), Mookherjee (2010) and Gibbons and Roberts (2010).
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II. Management in the Indian textile industry
II.A. Why work with firms in the Indian textile industry?
Despite rapid growth over the past decade, India’s one billion people still have labor productivity 
that is only 15 per cent of US productivity (McKinsey Global Institute, 2001). While average 
productivity is low, most notable is the large variation in productivity, with a few highly productive 
firms and a lot of low-productivity firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). 
In common with other developing countries for which data is available, Indian firms are also 
typically poorly managed. Evidence from this is seen in Figure 1, which plots results from the 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) surveys of manufacturing firms in the US and India. The Bloom 
and Van Reenen (BVR) methodology scores firms from 1 (worst practices) to 5 (best practices) 
on specific management practices related to monitoring, targets and incentives. Aggregating 
yields a basic measure of the use of modern management practices that is strongly correlated 
with a wide range of firm performance measures, like productivity, profitability and growth. The 
top panel of Figure 1 plots these management practice scores for a sample of 751 randomly 
chosen US manufacturing firms with 100 to 5,000 employees and the second panel for similarly 
sized Indian ones. The results reveal a thick tail of badly run Indian firms, leading to a lower 
average management score (2.69 for India versus 3.33 for US firms). Indian firms tend not to 
collect and analyze data systematically in their factories, they tend not to set and monitor clear 
targets for performance, and they do not explicitly link pay or promotion with performance. The 
scores for Brazil and China in the third panel, with an average of 2.67, are similar, suggesting 
that Indian firms are broadly representative of large firms in emerging economies.
In order to implement a common set of management practices across firms and measure 
a common set of outcomes, we focus on one industry. We chose textile production since it 
is the largest manufacturing industry in India, accounting for 22 per cent of manufacturing 
employment. The fourth panel shows the management scores for the 232 textile firms in the 
BVR Indian sample, which look very similar to Indian manufacturing in general. 
Within textiles, our experiment was carried out on 28 plants operated by 17 firms in the woven 
cotton fabric industry. These plants weave cotton yarn into cotton fabric for suits, shirts and 
home furnishing. They purchase yarn from upstream spinning firms and send their fabric to 
downstream dyeing and processing firms. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, the 17 
firms involved had an average BVR management score of 2.60, very similar to the rest of Indian 
manufacturing. Hence, our particular sample of 17 Indian firms also appears broadly similar in 
terms of management practices to manufacturing firms in developing countries.
II.B. The selection of firms for the field experiment
The sample firms were randomly chosen from the population of all publicly and privately owned 
textile firms in Maharashtra, based on lists provided by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.6 We 
restricted attention to firms with between 100 to 1,000 employees to focus on larger firms but 
avoided multinationals. Geographically we focused on firms in the towns of Tarapur and Umbergaon 
(the largest two textile towns in the area) since this reduced the travel time for the consultants. 
This yielded a sample of 66 potential subject firms. 
All of these 66 firms were then contacted by telephone by our partnering international consulting 
firm. They offered free consulting, funded by Stanford University and the World Bank, as part 
of a management research project. We paid for the consulting services to ensure that we 
controlled the intervention and could provide a homogeneous management treatment to all 
firms. We were concerned that if the firms made any co-payments they might have tried to 
direct the consulting, for example asking for help on marketing or finance. 
6 The MCA list comes from the Registrar of Business, with whom all public and private firms are legally required to register 
annually. Of course many firms do not register in India, but this is generally a problem with smaller firms, not with 100+ employee 
manufacturing firms which are too large and permanent to avoid Government notice. 
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Of this group of firms, 34 expressed an interest in the project and were given a follow-up visit 
and sent a personally signed letter from Stanford. Of the 34 firms, 17 agreed to commit senior 
management time to the consulting program.7 We compared these program firms with the 49 
non-program firms and found no significant differences in observables.8 
The experimental firms have typically been in operation for 20 years and all are family-owned. 
They all produce fabric for the domestic market, and some also export. Table 1 reports some 
summary statistics for the textile manufacturing parts of these firms (many of the firms have 
other businesses in textile processing, retail and real estate). On average these firms had about 
270 employees, current assets of $13 million and sales of $7.5m a year. Compared to US 
manufacturing firms these firms would be in the top 2 per cent by employment and the top 5 per 
cent by sales,9 and compared to India manufacturing in the top 1 per cent by both employment 
and sales (Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). Hence, these are large manufacturing firms.10 
These firms are complex organizations, with a median of two plants per firm (plus a head office 
in Mumbai) and four reporting levels from the shop-floor to the managing director. In all the 
firms, the managing director is the largest shareholder, and all directors are family members. 
One firm is publicly quoted on the Mumbai Stock Exchange, although more than 50 per cent 
of the equity is held by the managing director and his father. 
In Exhibits (1) to (7) in the Appendix we include a set of photographs of the plants. These are 
included to provide some background information to readers on their size, production process 
and initial state of management. Each plant site involves several multi-story buildings (Exhibit 
1). The plants operate a continuous production process that runs constantly (Exhibit 2). The 
factories’ floors were rather disorganized (Exhibits 3 and 4), and their yarn and spare-parts 
inventory stores lacked any formalized storage systems (Exhibits 5 and 6). 
III. The management intervention
III.A.Why use management consulting as an intervention 
The field experiment aimed to improve management practices in the treatment plants. To 
achieve this we hired a management consultancy firm to work with the plants as the easiest 
way to rapidly change plant-level management. We selected the consulting firm using an open 
tender. The winner was a large international management consultancy which is headquartered 
in the US but has about 40,000 employees in India. The full-time team of (up to) 6 consultants 
working on the project at any time all came from their Mumbai office. These consultants were 
educated at leading Indian business and engineering schools, and most of them had prior 
experience working with US and European multinationals.
Selecting a high profile international consulting firm substantially increased the cost of the 
project.11 However, it meant that our experimental firms were more prepared to trust the 
consultants, which was important for getting a representative sample group. It also offered the 
largest potential to improve the management practices of the firms in our study. 
The project ran from August 2008 until August 2010, and the total cost was US$1.3 million, 
approximately $75,000 per treatment plant and $20,000 per control plant. Note this is very 
different from what the firms themselves would pay for this consulting, which would be probably 
7 The main reasons we were given for refusing free consulting were that the firms did not believe they needed management 
assistance or that it required too much time from their senior management (1 day a week). But it is also possible these firms were 
suspicious of the offer, given many firms in India have tax and regulatory irregularities.   
8 For example, the program firms had slightly less assets ($12.8m) compared to the non-program firms ($13.9m), but this difference 
was not statistically significant (p-value 0.841). We also compared the groups on management practices using the BVR scores, 
and found they were almost identical (difference of 0.031, p-value 0.859). 
9 Dunn & Bradstreet (August 2009) lists 778,000 manufacturing firms in the US with only 17,300 of these (2.2%) with 270 or more 
employees and only 28,900 (3.7%) with $7.5m or more sales. 
10 Note that most international agencies define large firms as those with more than 250+ employees.
11 At the bottom of the consulting quality distribution in India consultants are cheaper, but their quality is poor. At the top end, rates 
are similar to those in the US because international consulting companies target multinationals and employ consultants that are 
often US or European educated and have access to international labor markets.
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about $250,000. The reason for our much cheaper costs per plant is that, because it was a 
research project, the consultancy charged us pro-bono rates (50 per cent of commercial rates), 
provided free partner time and enjoyed economies of scale working across multiple plants.
While the intervention offered high-quality management consulting, the purpose of our study was 
to use the improvements in management generated by this intervention to understand if (and 
how) modern management practices affect firm performance. Like many recent development 
field experiments, this intervention was provided as a mechanism of convenience – to change 
management practices – and not to evaluate the management consultants themselves. 
III.B. The management consulting intervention
The intervention aimed to introduce a set of standard management practices. Based on their 
prior industry experience, the consultants identified 38 key practices on which to focus. These 
practices encompass a range of basic manufacturing principles that are standard in almost all 
US, European and Japanese firms, and can be grouped into five areas:
• Factory Operations: Regular maintenance of machines and recording the reasons for 
breakdowns to learn from failures. Keeping the factory floor tidy to reduce accidents and ease 
the movement of materials. 
• Quality control: Recording quality defects by type, analyzing these records daily, and formalizing 
procedures to address defects to prevent them recurring.
• Inventory: Recording yarn stocks on a daily basis, with optimal inventory levels defined and 
stock monitored against these. Yarn sorted, labeled and stored in the warehouse by type and 
color, and this information logged onto a computer. 
• Human-resource management: Performance-based incentive system for workers and 
managers. Job descriptions defined for all workers and managers.
• Sales and order management: Tracking production on an order-wise basis to prioritize 
customer orders by delivery deadline. Using design-wise efficiency analysis so pricing can be 
based on design (rather than average) production costs. 
These 38 management practices (listed in Appendix Table A1) form a set of precisely defined 
binary indicators that we can use to measure changes in management practices as a result of 
the consulting intervention.12 We recorded these indicators on an on-going basis throughout the 
study. A general pattern at baseline was that plants recorded a variety of information (often in 
paper sheets), but had no systems in place to monitor these records or use them in decisions. 
Thus, while 93 percent of the treatment plants recorded quality defects before the intervention, 
only 29 percent monitored them on a daily basis or by the particular sort of defect, and none 
of them had any standardized analysis and action plan based on this defect data.
The consulting treatment had three stages. The first stage, called the diagnostic phase, took 
one month and was given to all treatment and control plants. It involved evaluating the current 
management practices of each plant and constructing a performance database. Construction 
of this database involved setting up processes for measuring a range of plant-level metrics 
– such as output, efficiency, quality, inventory and energy use – on an ongoing basis, plus 
extracting historical data from existing records. For example, to facilitate quality monitoring on 
a daily basis, a single metric, termed the Quality Defects Index (QDI), was constructed as a 
severity-weighted average of the major types of defects. At the end of the diagnostic phase the 
consulting firm provided each plant with a detailed analysis of its current management practices 
and performance. This phase involved about 15 days of consulting time per plant.
12 We prefer these indicators to the BVR management score for our work here, since they are all binary indicators of specific 
practices, which are directly linked to the intervention. In contrast, the BVR indicator measures practices at a more general level on 
a 5-point ordinal scale. Nonetheless, the sum of our 38 pre-intervention management practice scores is correlated with the BVR 
score at 0.404 (p-value of 0.077) across the 17 firms. 
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The second step was a four month implementation phase given only to the treatment plants. In 
this phase, the consulting firm followed up on the diagnostic report to help introduce as many 
of the 38 key management practices as the firms could be persuaded to adopt. The consultant 
assigned to each plant worked with the plant management to put the procedures into place, 
fine-tune them, and stabilize them so that they could readily be carried out by employees. For 
example, one of the practices was daily meetings for management to review production and 
quality data. The consultant attended these meetings for the first few weeks to help the managers 
run them, provided feedback on how to run future meetings, and adjusted their design. This 
phase also involved about 15 days a month of consulting time per plant.
The third phase was a measurement phase which lasted until August 2010. This phase involved 
only three consultants (and a part-time manager) who collected performance and management 
data from all treatment and control plants. In return for the firms’ continuing to provide this 
data, the consultants provided some light consulting advice to both the treatment and control 
plants. This phase involved about 1.5 days a month of consulting time per plant.
So, in summary, the control plants were provided with the diagnostic phase and then the 
measurement phase (totaling 225 consultant hours on average), while the treatment plants 
were provided with the diagnostic, implementation and then measurement phases (totaling 
733 consultant hours on average).
III.C. The experimental design
We wanted to work with large firms because their complexity means management practices 
are likely to be important. However, providing consulting to large firms is expensive, which 
necessitated a number of trade-offs detailed below.
Cross-sectional sample size: We worked with 17 firms. We considered hiring cheaper local 
consultants and providing more limited consulting to a sample of several hundred plants in 
more locations. But two factors pushed against this. First, many large firms in India are reluctant 
to let outsiders into their plants because of their lack of compliance with tax, labor and safety 
regulations. To minimize selection bias we offered a high quality intensive consulting intervention 
that firms would value enough to take the risk of allowing outsiders into their plants. This helped 
maximize initial take-up (26 per cent as noted in section II.B) and retention (100 per cent, as no 
firms dropped out). Second, the consensus from discussions with Indian business people was 
that achieving a measurable impact in large firms would require an extended engagement with 
high-quality consultants. Obviously the trade-off was that this led to a small cross-sectional 
sample size. We discuss the estimation issues this generates in section III.D below.
Treatment and control plants: The 17 firms in our sample had 28 plants. Due to manpower 
constraints we could collect detailed performance data from only 20 plants, so we designated 
20 plants as ‘experimental’ plants and randomly picked six control plants and 14 treatment 
plants. As Table 1 shows, the treatment and control firms were not statistically different across 
any of the characteristics we could observe.13 The remaining eight plants were then the ‘non-
experimental plants’: three in control firms and five in treatment firms. These non-experimental 
plants did not themselves receive consulting services, but data on their management practices 
and organizational and IT outcomes were collected in bi-monthly visits.
Timing: The consulting intervention was executed in three waves because of the capacity 
constraint of the six-person consulting team. The first wave started in September 2008 with 
four treatment plants. In April 2009 a second wave of ten treatment plants was initiated, and in 
July 2009 the diagnostic phase for the six control plants was carried out. Firm records usually 
allowed us to collect data going back to a common starting point of April 2008. 
13 Treatment and control plants were never in the same firms. The 6 control plants were randomly selected first, and then the 14 
treatment firms randomly selected from the remaining 11 firms which did not have a control plant.   
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We started with a small first wave because we expected the intervention process to get easier 
over time due to accumulated experience. The second wave included all the remaining treatment 
firms because: (i) the consulting interventions take time to affect performance and we wanted 
the longest time-window to observe the treatment firms; and (ii) we could not mix the treatment 
and control firms across implementation waves.14 The third wave contained the control firms. We 
picked more treatment than control plants because the staggered initiation of the interventions 
meant the different treatment groups provided some cross identification for each other, and 
because we believed the treatment plants would be more useful for understanding why firms 
had not adopted management practices before.
III.D. Small sample size
The focus on large firms meant we had to work with a small sample of firms. This raises three 
broad issues. A first potential concern is whether the sample size is too small to identify significant 
impacts. A second is what type of statistical inference is appropriate given the sample size. 
Third, the sample may be too small to be representative of large firms in developing countries. 
We discuss each concern in turn and the steps we took to address them. 
Significance of results: Even though we have only 20 experimental plants across 17 firms, 
we obtain statistically significant results. There are five reasons for this. First, these are large 
plants with about 80 looms and about 130 employees each, so that idiosyncratic shocks – like 
machine breakdowns or worker illness – tend to average out. Second, the data were collected 
directly from the machine logs, so have very little (if any) measurement error. Third, the firms are 
homogenous in terms of size, product, region and technology, so that time dummies control 
for most external shocks. Fourth, we collected weekly data, which provides high-frequency 
observations over the course of the treatment and the use of these repeated measures can 
dramatically reduce the sample size needed to detect a given treatment effect (McKenzie, 
2010b). Finally, the intervention was intensive, leading to large treatment effects – for example, 
the point estimate for the reduction in quality defects was over 50 per cent.
Statistical inference: A second concern is over using statistical tests which rely on asymptotic 
arguments in the N dimension to justify the normal approximation. We use three alternatives to 
address this concern. First, we use firm-clustered bootstrap standard errors (Cameron et al, 
2008). Second, we implement permutation procedures (for both the Intent to Treat (ITT) and 
Instrumental Variables estimators) that have exact finite sample size and so do not rely upon 
asymptotic approximations. Third, we exploit our large T sample to implement procedures that 
rely upon asymptotic approximations along the time dimension (with a fixed N).
Permutation Tests: Permutation tests use the fact that order statistics are sufficient and 
complete statistics to derive critical values for test procedures. We first implement this for the 
null hypothesis of no treatment effect against the two sided alternative for the ITT parameter. 
This calculates the ITT coefficient for every possible combination of 11 treatment firms out of 
our 17 total firms (we run this at the firm level to allow for firm-level correlations in errors). Once 
this is calculated for the 12,376 possible treatment assignments (17 choose 11), the 2.5 per 
cent and 97.5 per cent confidence intervals are calculated as the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles 
of the treatment impact. A treatment effect outside these bounds can be said to be significant 
at the 5 per cent level. Permutation tests for the IV estimator are more complex, involving 
implementing a procedure based on Greevy et al. (2004) and Andrews and Marmer (2008) 
(see Appendix B). 
T-asymptotic clustered standard errors: An alternative approach is to use asymptotic 
estimators that exploit the large time dimension for each firm. To do this we use the recent 
results by Ibramigov and Mueller (2009) to implement a t-statistic based estimator that is 
14 Each wave had a one-day kick-off meeting involving presentations from senior partners from the consulting firm. This helped 
impress the firms with the expertise of the consulting firm and highlighted the potential for performance improvements. Since this 
meeting involved a project outline, and we did not tell firms about the existence of treatment and control groups, we could not mix 
the groups in the meetings.
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robust to substantial heterogeneity across firms as well as to considerable autocorrelation 
across observations within a firm. This approach requires estimating the parameter of interest 
separately for each treatment firm and then treating the resultant set of 11 estimates as a 
draw from a t distribution with ten degrees of freedom (see Appendix B). Such a procedure 
is valid in the sense of having correct size (for fixed N) so long as the time dimension is large 
enough that the estimate for each firm can be treated as a draw from a normal distribution. In 
our application we have on average over 100 observations for each firm, so this requirement 
is likely to be met.
Representativeness of the sample: A third concern with our small sample is how representative 
it is of large firms in developing countries. In part this concern represents a general issue for 
field experiments, which are often run on individuals, villages or firms in particular regions or 
industries. In our situation we focus on one region and one industry, albeit India’s commercial 
hub (Mumbai) and its largest industry (textiles). Comparing our sample to the population of 
large (100 to 5,000 employee) firms in India, both overall and in textiles, suggests that our small 
sample is at least broadly representative in terms of management practices (see Figure 1). In 
section V.D we also report results on a plant-by-plant basis to further demonstrate the results 
are not driven by any particular plant outlier. While we have a small sample, the results are 
relatively stable across the individual sample plants. 
III.E.  The potential conflict of interest in having the consulting firm  
measuring performance
A final design challenge was the potential for a conflict of interest in having our consulting 
firm measuring the performance of the experimental firms. To address this about every other 
month one of the research team visited the firms in India, meeting with the firms’ directors and 
presenting in detail the quality, inventory and output data the consultants had sent us. This 
was not only a useful way to initiate discussions on the impact of the experiment, but also 
important for confirming the data we were receiving reflected reality. Moreover, when visiting 
the factories we could visually confirm whether the interventions had led to the reorganization 
of the factory floor, reduced inventory and improved quality control.
IV. The impact on management practices
In Figure 2 we plot the average management practice adoption of the 38 practices for the 14 
treatment plants, the six control plants, and the eight non-experimental plants. This data is shown 
at two month intervals before and after the diagnostic phase. Data from the diagnostic phase 
onwards was compiled from direct observation at the factory. Data from before the diagnostic 
phase was collected from detailed interviews of the plant management team based on any 
changes to management practices during the prior year. Figure 2 shows five key results:
First, all plants started off with low baseline adoption rates of the set of 38 management 
practices.15 Among the 28 individual plants the initial adoption rates varied from a low of 7.9 
per cent to a high of 55.3 per cent, so that even the best managed plant in the group had just 
over half of the key textile-manufacturing practices in place. This is consistent with the results 
on poor general management practices in Indian firms shown in Figure 1. For example, many 
of the plants did not have any formalized system for recording or improving production quality, 
which meant that the same quality defect could arise repeatedly. Most of the plants also had 
not organized their yarn inventories, so that yarn stores were mixed by color and type, without 
labeling or computerized entry. The production floor was often blocked by waste, tools and 
machinery, impeding the flow of workers and materials around the factory.
Second, the intervention did succeed in changing management practices. The treatment plants 
increased their use of the 38 practices over the period by 37.8 percentage points on average 
(an increase from 25.6 per cent to 63.4 per cent).
15 The pre-treatment difference between the treatment, control and other plant groups is not statistically significant, with a p-value on 
the difference of 0.248 (see Table A1).
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Figure 1: Management practice scores across countries
Notes: Management practice histograms using Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) methodology. Double-blind 
surveys used to evaluate firms’ monitoring, targets and operations. Scores from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best 
practice). Samples are 695 US firms, 620 Indian firms, 1083 Brazilian and Chinese firms, 232 Indian textile firms 
and 17 experimental firms
Third, the treatment plants’ adoption of management practices occurred gradually. In large part 
this reflects the time taken for the consulting firm to gain the confidence of the firms’ directors. 
Initially many directors were skeptical about the suggested management changes, and they 
often started by piloting the easiest changes around quality and inventory in one part of the 
factory. Once these started to generate improvements, these changes were rolled out and the 
firms then began introducing the more complex improvements around operations and HR. 
Fourth, the control plants, which were given only the 1 month diagnostic, increased their adoption 
of these management practices, but by only 12 per cent on average. This is substantially less 
than the increase in adoption in the treatment firms, indicating that the four months of the 
implementation phase were important in changing management practices. The control firms 
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16 Note that most papers using repeated surveys have found no significant panel linkage between management practices and 
performance (Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Black and Lynch (2004)). 
typically did not adopt the more complex practices like daily quality meetings, formalizing the 
yarn monitoring process or defining roles and responsibilities.
Fifth, the non-experimental plants in the treatment firms also saw a substantial increase in the 
adoption of management practices. In these five plants the adoption rates increased by 17.5 
per cent. This increase occurred because the owners of the treatment firms copied the new 
practices from their experimental plants over to their other plants. 
V. The impact of management on performance
Previous work has shown a strong correlation between management practices and firm 
performance in the cross-section, with a few papers (eg, Ichniowski et al. 1998) also showing 
this in the panel.16 Our unique panel data on management practices and plant level performance, 
coupled with the experiment, enables us to examine the extent to which these relations are 
causal. We begin with a panel fixed-effects specification:
OUTCOMEi,t = ai + bt + qMANAGEMENTi,t+ni,t (2)
where OUTCOME will be one of the key performance metrics of quality, inventory and output. 
The concern is that management practices are not exogenous to the outcomes that are being 
assessed, even in changes. For example, a firm may start monitoring quality only when it starts 
to experience a larger than usual number of defects, which would bias the fixed-effect estimate 
towards finding a negative effect of better management on quality. Or firms may start monitoring 
product quality as part of a major upgrade of workers and equipment, in which case we would 
misattribute quality improvements from better capital and labor to better management. 
Notes: Average adoption rates of the 38 key textile manufacturing management practices listed in Table 2. 
Shown separately for the 14 treatment plants (diamond symbol), six control plants (plus symbol), the five non-
experimental plants in the treatment firms which the consultants did not provide any direct consulting assistance 
to (round symbol) and the three non-experimental plants in the control firms (square symbol). Scores range 
from 0 (if none of the group of plants have adopted any of the 38 management practices) to one (if all of the 
group of plants have adopted all of the 38 management practices). Initial differences across all the groups are 
not statistically significant.
Figure 2: The adoption of key textile management practices over time
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To overcome this endogeneity problem, we instrument the management practice score with log 
(1+weeks since the implementation phase began)17. We use this logarithmic form because of 
the concave adoption path of management practices shown in Figure 2, with the results robust 
to alternative functional form specifications such as linear or quadratic. The exclusion restriction 
is that the intervention affected the outcome of interest only through its impact on management 
practices, and not through any other channel. A justification for this assumption is that the 
consulting firm focused entirely on the 38 management practices in their recommendations 
to firms, and firms did not buy new equipment or hire new labor as a result of the intervention 
during the period of our study. The IV estimator will then allow us to answer the headline question 
of this paper – does management matter? 
If the impact of management practices on plant-level outcomes is the same for all plants, then IV 
will consistently estimate the marginal effect of improvements in management practices, telling 
us how much management matters for the average plant participating in the study. However, 
if the effects of better management are heterogeneous, then the IV estimator will consistently 
estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE). The LATE will then give the average treatment 
effect for plants which do change their management practices when offered free consulting. If 
plants which stand to gain more from improving management are the ones who change their 
management practices most as a result of the consulting, then the LATE will exceed the average 
marginal return to management. It will understate the average return to better management if 
instead the plants that change management only when free consulting is provided are those 
with the least to gain.
There was heterogeneity in the extent to which treatment plants changed their practices, with 
the before-after change in the management practice score ranging from 26.3 to 60 percentage 
points. The feedback from the consulting firm was that to some extent it was firms with the most 
unengaged, uncooperative managers who changed practices least, suggesting that the LATE 
may underestimate the average impact of better management if these firms have the largest 
potential gains from better management. Nonetheless, we believe the LATE to be a parameter 
of policy interest, since if governments are to employ policies to try to improve management, 
information on the returns to better management from those who actually change management 
practices when help is offered is informative.
We can also directly estimate the impact of the consulting services which improved management 
practices via the following equation:
OUTCOMEi,t = ai + bt + cTREATi,t + ei,t  (3)
where TREATi,t is a 1/0 variable for whether plants have started the implementation phase or 
not. The parameter c then gives the ITT, which is the average impact of the intervention in the 
treated plants compared to the control plants. 
V.A Quality
Our measure of quality is the Quality Defects Index (QDI), a weighted average score of quality 
defects, which is available for all but one of the plants. Higher scores imply more defects. Figure 
3 provides a plot of the QDI score for the treatment and control plants relative to the start of the 
treatment period. This is September 2008 for Wave 1 treatment, April 2009 for Wave 2 treatment 
and control plants.18 This is normalized to 100 for both groups of plants using pre-treatment 
data. To generate point-wise confidence intervals we block bootstrapped over firms. 
17 Note that this is defined as zero for control plants and for treatment plants pre-implementation.
18 Since the control plants have no treatment period we set their timing to zero to coincide with the 10 Wave 2 treatment plants. This 
maximizes the overlap of the data. 
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It is clear the treatment plants started to reduce their QDI scores (ie, improve quality) significantly 
and rapidly from about week five onwards, which was the beginning of the implementation 
phase following the initial one month diagnostic phase. The control firms also showed a mild 
downward trend in their QDI scores from about week 30 onwards, consistent with their slower 
take-up of these practices in the absence of a formal implementation phase.
Table 2 in columns (1) to (4) examines whether management practices improve quality using 
regression analysis. In column (1) we present the fixed-effects OLS results which regresses 
the weekly log(QDI) score on plant level management practices, plant fixed effects, and a 
set of weekly time dummies. The standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the firm level to 
allow for any correlation across different experimental plants within the same firm. The -0.561 
coefficient implies that increasing the adoption of management practices by 1 percentage 
point would be associated with about a 0.6 per cent reduction in defects, although this is not 
statistically significant. 
In Table 2 column (2) we report the first stage from using the experimental intervention to identify 
the causal impact of better management on quality. The coefficient on log cumulative treatment is 
extremely significant, reflecting the fact that the intervention substantially increased the adoption 
of management practices. In column (3) we report the second stage, finding a significant point 
estimate of -2.028, suggesting that increasing the practice adoption rate by 1 percentage point 
would lead to a reduction in quality defects of about 2 per cent. The large rise in the point 
estimate from the OLS to the IV estimator suggests firms may be endogenously adopting better 
management practices when their quality starts to deteriorate. There was anecdotal evidence 
for the latter, in that the consulting firm reported plants with worsening quality were often the 
most keen to implement the new management practices because of their concern over quality 
problems. This has some conceptual similarities with the broader empirical literature showing 
that tough times – measured by higher competition – raises productivity (eg, Syverson 2004a), 
presumably in part because firms respond by improving management.
Notes: Displays the average weekly quality defects index, which is a weighted index of quality defects, so a 
higher score means lower quality. This is plotted for the 14 treatment plants (+ symbols) and the 6 control plants 
(♦ symbols). Values normalized so both series have an average of 100 prior to the start of the intervention. To 
obtain confidence intervals we bootstrapped the firms with replacement 250 times. 
Figure 3: Quality defects index for the treatment and control plants
15
Does management matter? Evidence from India
Start of 
Diagnostic 
Start of 
Implementation 
End of 
Implementation 
Week after the start of the intervention
120
100
80
60
 
Y
ar
n 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
(n
or
m
al
iz
ed
 t
o 
10
0 
p
rio
r 
to
 d
ia
gn
os
tic
) 
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 -40 50
Treatment plants
Control plants
2.5th percentile 
Average (+ symbol) 
97.5th percentile 
Average (  symbol) 
2.5th percentile 
97.5th percentile 
The reason for this large effect is that measuring defects allows firms to address quality problems 
rapidly. For example, a faulty loom that creates weaving errors would be picked up in the daily 
QDI score and dealt with in the next day’s quality meeting. Without this, the problem would 
often persist for several weeks, since the checking and mending team had no mechanism (or 
incentive) for resolving defects. In the longer term the QDI also allows managers to identify 
the largest sources of quality defects by type, design, yarn, loom and weaver, and start to 
address these systematically. For example, designs with complex stitching that generate large 
numbers of quality defects can be dropped from the sales catalogue. This ability to improve 
quality dramatically through systematic data collection and evaluation is a key element of the 
successful lean manufacturing system of production (see, for example, Womack, Jones and 
Roos, 1992). 
Finally, in column (4) we look at the ITT, which is the average reduction in the defects index after 
the intervention in the treatment plants versus the control plants. We see a 32 per cent (= exp(-
.386)-1) fall in the QDI index, meaning the intervention cut quality defects by about a third.
At the foot of table 2 we also present our Ibramigov-Mueller (IM) and permutation significance 
tests. First, looking at the IM tests that exploit asymptotics in T rather than N, we find that the 
IV and ITT results are both significant at the 5 per cent level (zero is outside the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals). For the standard permutation tests the ITT is again significant at the 5 
per cent level (the p-value is 0.0168), as are the IV-permutation tests.
V.B Inventory
Figure 4 shows the plot of inventory levels over time for the treatment and control groups. It 
is clear that after the intervention the inventory levels in the treatment group fall relative to the 
control group, with this being point-wise significant by about 30 weeks after the intervention.
The reason for this effect is that these firms were carrying about four months of inventory on 
average before the intervention, including a large amount of dead stock. Often, because of poor 
records and storage practices, firms did not even know they had these stocks. By cataloguing 
Figure 4: Yarn inventory for the treatment and control plants
Notes: Displays the average weekly quality defects index, which is a weighted index of quality defects, so a 
Notes: Displays the weekly average yarn inventory plotted for 12 treatment plants (+ symbols) and the six control 
plants (♦ symbols). Values normalized so both series have an average of 100 prior to the start of the intervention. 
To obtain confidence intervals we bootstrapped the firms with replacement 250 times. Two treatment plants 
maintain no on-site yarn inventory.
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the yarn and sending the shade-cards to the design team to include in new products,19 selling 
dead yarn stock, introducing restocking norms for future purchases, and monitoring inventory on 
a daily basis, the firms reduced their inventories. But this took time as the reduction in inventories 
primarily arose from lowering stocking norms and using old yarn for new products. 
Table 2 columns (5) to (7) shows the regression results for log of raw material (yarn) inventory. 
The results are presented for the 18 plants for which we have yarn inventory data (two plants 
do not maintain yarn stocks on site). In column (5) we present the fixed-effects result which 
regresses the weekly yarn on the plant level management practices, plant fixed-effects, and a set 
of weekly time dummies. The coefficient of -0.639 says that increasing management practices 
adoption rates by 1 percentage point would be associated with a yarn inventory reduction of 
about 0.6 per cent. In Table 2, column (6), we see the impact of management instrumented 
with the intervention displays a point estimate of -0.929, somewhat higher than the FE estimates 
in column (1).20 Again, the IV estimator is higher than the OLS estimator, suggesting that the 
adoption of better management practices may be endogenous (or at least downward biased 
by measurement error). In column (7) we see the intervention causes an average reduction in 
yarn inventory of (exp(-.179)-1=) 16.4%.
These numbers are substantial but not unprecedented. Japanese automotive firms achieved 
much greater reductions in inventory levels (as well as quality improvements) from the adoption 
of lean manufacturing technology. Many firms reduced inventory levels from several months to 
a few hours by moving to just-in-time production (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1991).
Finally, as with the quality defects estimates, the IM confidence interval for the IV estimator 
finds the coefficient significant at the 5 per cent level. However, the IV permutation tests cannot 
exclude zero. Looking at the ITT coefficient, we see that under IM the results are significant at 
the 10 per cent level, although again not significant using the standard permutation tests.
V.C Output
In Figure 5 we plot output over time for the treatment and control plants. Output is measured in 
physical terms, as production picks21. The results here are less striking, although output of the 
treatment plants has clearly risen on average relative to the control firms, and this difference is 
point-wise statistically significant in some weeks towards the end of the period. 
In columns (8) to (10) in table 2 we look at this in a regression setting with plant and time dummies. 
In column (8) the OLS coefficient of 0.127 implies increasing the adoption of management 
practices by 1 percentage point would be associated with about a 0.1 per cent increase in 
output. In column (9), we see the impact of management instrumented with the intervention 
displays a higher significant point estimate of 0.346. As with quality and inventory the IV estimator 
is again notably higher than the OLS estimator, again indicating an endogenous adoption of 
better management when output falls. Finally, in column (10) we look at the ITT and see a point 
estimate of 0.056, implying a 5.4 per cent increase in output (exp(0.056)-1), although this only 
significant at the 11 per cent level.22 Looking at the small-sample standard errors we find the 
IM and permutation tests are all significant at the 5 per cent or 10 per cent level.
There are several reasons for these increases in output. Undertaking routine maintenance of 
the looms reduces breakdowns. Collecting and monitoring the breakdown data also helps 
highlight looms, shifts, designs and yarn-types that are associated with more breakdowns. 
Visual displays around the factory floor together with the incentive schemes motivate workers to 
improve operating efficiency. Finally, keeping the factory floor clean and tidy reduces the number 
19 Shade cards comprise a few inches of sample yarn, plus information on its color, thickness and material. These are sent to the 
design teams in Mumbai who use these to design new products using the surplus yarn. 
20 We do not report the IV first-stage as this is very similar to the first stage for quality shown in column (2).
21 A production pick is a single crossing of the shuttle, representing the weaving of one thread of weft yarn.  
22 The IV is significant (and not the ITT) because the first stage of the IV uses log(cumulative treatment) rather than the binary 1/0 
treatment variable, with the former more correlated with the gradual improvement in performance. Running the reduced-form for 
log(output) returns a coefficient (s.e.) of 0.028 (0.009) on log(cumulative treatment).
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of untoward incidents like tools falling into machines or factory fires. Again the experience from 
lean manufacturing is that the collective impact of these procedures can lead to extremely large 
improvements in operating efficiency, raising output levels.
V.D Results by plant
We can also examine the difference in quality, inventory and output after treatment on a plant 
by plant basis. Figure 6 plots the histograms of the before-after changes in our performance 
measures for the treatment and control plants. No outliers are driving these differences, with 
all treatment plants improving their quality (top-left plot), nine of the treatment plants improving 
their inventory (top-right plot) and all treatment plants improving their output (bottom left plot). In 
comparison the control plants appear to be fairly randomly distributed around the zero impact 
point. We can also test the statistical difference of these changes between the two groups, 
and find the p-value on the difference in differences is 0.035 for quality, is 0.096 for inventory 
and 0.010 for output.23 
V.E Are the improvements in performance due to Hawthorne effects?
Hawthorne effects are named after a series experiments carried out at the Hawthorne Works in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The results apparently showed that just running experiments and collecting 
data can improve performance, raising concerns that our results could be spurious.
However, we think this is unlikely, for a series of reasons. First, our control plants also had 
the consultants on site over a similar period of time as the treatment firms. Both sets of 
plants got the initial diagnostic period and the follow-up measurement period, with the only 
difference being the treatment plants also got an intensive consulting during the intermediate 
4 month implementation stage while the control plants had briefer, but frequent, visits from the 
consultants collecting data. The control plants were not told they were in the control group. 
Hence, it cannot be simply the presence of the consultants or the measurement of performance 
that generated the improvement in performance. Second, the improvements in performance 
23 Formally, we test this by regressing the 20 plant level differences on a 1/0 dummy variable for being a treatment firm, and report 
the p-value on that dummy, clustering at the parent firm level.
Figure 5: Output for the treatment and control plants
Notes: Displays the weekly average output for the 14 treatment plants (+ symbols) and the 6 control plants (♦ 
symbols). Values normalized so both series have an average of 100 prior to the start of the intervention. To obtain 
confidence intervals we bootstrapped the firms with replacement 250 times.
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took time to arise and they arose in quality, inventory and efficiency, where the majority of the 
management changes took place. Third, these improvements persisted for many months after 
the implementation period, so are not some temporary phenomena due to increased attention. 
Finally, the firms themselves also believed these improvements arose from better management 
practices, which was the motivation for them extensively copying these practices out to their 
other non-experimental plants (see Figure 2).
VI. The impact of management practices on 
organization and computerization
VI.A The impact of management practices on firm organization
Although our interventions were never intended to directly change the treatment firms’ organizational 
design, theory gave us some reason to believe that organizational changes might follow as a result 
of better management practices due to changes in the information available to decision makers. 
In recent years a large theoretical literature on the economics of organization has developed 
dealing with the locus of decision-making within firms. However, this literature does not lead to 
clear-cut predictions about the effects of increased availability of information to managers. On the 
one hand, models of hierarchy as specialization in knowledge acquisition (like Garicano, 2000) 
suggest that more decisions ought to be taken at lower levels if the amount of information available 
to all levels is increased. Similarly, a standard agency perspective might also suggest that more 
decisions would be delegated if new or more accurate performance measures become available, 
especially if (as in our sample) the directors are under significant time constraints. However, to 
the extent that the plant managers were initially better informed than their bosses by virtue of 
being closer to the operations, the availability of the better measures might have reduced their 
information advantage, favoring the directors’ making more decisions. But while the theoretical 
literature is large, the empirical literature is very limited.
Figure 6 Plant level changes in performance
Notes: Displays the histogram of plant by plant changes in log (Quality Defects Index), log (Inventory) and log 
(Output) between the post and pre treatment periods. 
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To measure decentralization we collected data on eight variables: the locus of decision-making 
for weaver hiring, manager hiring, spares purchases, maintenance planning, weaver bonuses, 
investment, and departmental co-ordination, and the number of days per week the owner spent 
at the factory. Because firms’ organizational designs change slowly over time, we collected 
this data at lower frequencies – pre-intervention, in March 2010 and in August 2010. For every 
decision except investment and days at the factory we scored decentralization on a 1 to 5 
scale, where 1 was defined as no authority of the plant manager over the decision and 5 as full 
authority (see Appendix Table A2 for the survey and Table A4 for descriptive statistics). These 
questions and scoring were based on the survey methodology in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 
(2009b), which measured decentralization across countries and found developing countries like 
India, China and Brazil typically have very centralized decision-making within firms. The measure 
of the decentralization for investment was in terms of ‘The largest expenditure (in rupees) a 
plant manager (or other managers) could typically make without a Director’s signature’, which 
had an average of 12,608 rupees (about $250). Finally, the number of days the owners spend 
each week at the factory is a revealed preference measure of decentralization. The owners 
are usually located either at their head-offices in Mumbai (which they prefer as it dramatically 
reduces their commute) or at the factory (if it needs direct management from them).
To combine all eight decentralization measures into one index we took the first principal 
component, which we called the decentralization index. We found changes in this index were 
strongly and significantly correlated with changes in management across firms, as better 
management led to more decentralization. Table 3 looks at this in a regression format:
DECENTRALIZATIONi,t = ai + bt +cMANAGEMENTi,t + ei,t (3)
where DECENTRALIZATION is our index of plant decentralization, and ai and bt are plant fixed 
effects and time dummies. In column (1) we run the OLS estimation and find a significant and 
positive coefficient, indicating that firms which improved their management practices during 
the experiment have also delegated more decisions to their plant managers. Given that the 
decentralization index has a standard deviation of 1 the magnitude of this coefficient is large – 
increasing the adoption of management practices by 37.8 per cent (the mean change for the 
treatment group) is associated with a 0.55 standard-deviation change increase in decentralization. 
So typically this would mean the owner reduces his factory visits from daily to three times a 
week, while also letting the plant manager make hiring decisions for weavers, award small weaver 
bonuses, and plan the weekly maintenance schedule. In column (2) we run the IV estimation, 
using the log(1+weeks since the implementation phase began) as the instrument, and again 
find a positive and significant impact. Finally, in column (3) we report a positive ITT. 
The consultants provided no advice on delegation and decentralization. It occurred in large 
part because the better monitoring of the factory operations allowed owners to delegate more 
decisions without fear of being exploited (the monitoring channel in the principal-agent group 
of organizational theories). For example, with daily inventory, quality and output data it is harder 
for the factory manager to steal inventory or output without detection by the owner. 
VI.B The impact of management practices on computerization
A major topic over the last decade has been the relationship between IT and productivity. A 
growing literature finds that the productivity impact of IT is substantially larger than its cost 
share (eg, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002). The literature argues this is because IT 
is complementary with modern management and organizational practices, so that as firms 
invest in IT they also improve their management practices. This leads to a positive bias on IT 
in productivity estimates because management and organizational practices are typically an 
unmeasured residual.24 But none of this literature has any experimental evidence. 
So to investigate the potential complementarity between IT and management practices we 
collected computerization data on nine aspects of the plants, covering the use of Enterprise 
24 See, for example, Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) and Bloom, Sadun and van Reenen (2009a).
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Resource Planning (ERP) systems, the number of computers, the age of the computers, the 
number of computer users, the total hours of computer use, the connection of the plant to 
the internet, the use of e-mail by the plant manager and the director, the existence of a firm 
website and the depth of computerization of production decisions (see Appendix Tables A3 
for the survey and Table A4 for descriptive statistics). As with the organizational changes we 
collected this data once from before the intervention, in March 2010 and in August 2010. Even 
in table A4 it is readily apparent that as firms adopted more modern management practices 
they significantly increased the computerization of their operations. Table 3 looks at this in a 
regression format:
COMPUTERIZATIONi,t = ai + bt +cMANAGEMENTi,t + ei,t (4)
where COMPUTERIZATION is measured in terms of the number of computer users (in columns 
(4) to (6)) or in terms of the overall computerization index (in columns (7) to (9)). In column (4) 
we see that the full adoption of all management practices is associated with an increase of 
16.76 hours of computer use a week, a rise of over 100 per cent given the pre-sample mean 
was 13.66 hours per week. In columns (5) and (6) we report the IV and ITT estimates, which 
show a similar result. The exclusion restriction here is that the consulting intervention did not 
directly change computerization, apart from its effect through the management practices. The 
consultants were not told to discuss computerization apart from its use in implementing the 
management practices, and in our own discussions with the owners we did not come across 
cases where they mentioned the consultants discussing computerization for other reasons. 
In columns (7) to (9) we report similar OLS, IV and ITT results for the computerization index, 
which is a broader measure of computer use, and again see highly significant increases from 
the management intervention.
These finding also relate to another major IT literature that has argued that skill biased technical 
change (SBTC) has been the major factor driving the increase in income inequality observed 
in the US and most other countries since the 1970s (see for example Autor, Katz and Kearney 
2008). But SBTC is usually inferred as the residual in inequality regressions, with rather limited 
direct evidence on specific skill-biased technologies. Our experimental changes in management 
practices are skilled-biased, in that computer users in India are relatively skilled due to the 
need for literacy and numeracy. As a result modern management practices are a skill-biased 
technology, driving both the use of computers and the demand for skilled workers. 
VII. Why do badly managed firms exist?
Given the evidence in section (IV) the obvious question is whether these management changes 
also increased profitability and productivity, and, if so, why they were not introduced before.
VII.A. The estimated impact of management practices on profits and productivity
Profits: Overall we estimate a total increase in profits of around $228,000, with our calculations 
outlined in Table A5. We could not obtain accounting data on these firms’ profits and losses. 
Public accounts data are available only with a lag of 2-3 years at the firm level (rather than plant, 
which is what we would want), and in our interviews with firm owners they told us they under-
report profits to avoid tax and also move profits to years when they want a loan (to have proof of 
income). When asked for their internal accounts the firms were evasive and would not provide them, 
beyond occasional comments that profits were in the range of $0.5m to $1m per year.25 So we 
estimated the changes from the quality, inventory and efficiency improvements. Our methodology 
is simple: for example, if an improvement in practices is estimated to reduce inventory stock by 
X tons of yarn, we map this into profits using conservative estimates of the cost of carrying X 
tons of yarn. Or if it reduces the numbers of hours required to mend defects we estimated this 
reduction in hours on the firm’s total wage bill. These estimates are medium-run because, for 
example, it takes a few months for the firms to reduce their mending manpower.
25 It is not even clear if firms actually keep correct records of their profits given the risk these could find their way to the tax 
authorities. For example, any employee that discovered these could use these to blackmail the firm.
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These estimates for increases in profits are potentially biased. There is a downward bias 
because we take firms’ initial capital, labor and product range as given. But in the long run 
the firms can re-optimize, for example, with more machines per weaver if quality improves (as 
dealing with breakdowns is time consuming). Furthermore, many of the management practices 
are complementary, so they are much more effective when introduced jointly (eg, Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1990). However, the intervention time-horizon was too short to change many of 
the complementary human-resource practices. The estimates are upward biased if the firms 
backslide on the management changes once the consultants leave.
To estimate the net increase in profit for these improvements in management practices we 
also need to calculate the costs of implementing these changes (ignoring for now any costs 
of consulting). These costs were small, averaging less than $3,000 per firm.26 So given the 
$250,000 this consulting would have cost these firms, this implies about a 90 per cent one-
year rate of return. 
Productivity: We estimate a total increase in productivity of 11.1 per cent, detailed in Table A5. 
Our methodology is again very simple, assuming a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function Y=ALaK1-a where Y is value-added (output − materials and energy costs), L is 
hours of work and K is the net capital stock. Using this we can back out changes in productivity 
after estimating changes in output and inputs. So, for example, reducing the yarn inventory 
by 16.4 per cent lowers capital by 1.3 per cent (yarn is 8% of the capital stock), increasing 
productivity by 0.6 per cent (capital has a factor share of 0.42). Our estimated productivity 
impact will also be subject to a number of the biases discussed above for profitability.
VII.B. Why are firms badly managed?
Given the evidence in section (VII.A) on the large increase in profitability from the introduction 
of these modern management practices, the obvious question is: Why had firms not already 
adopted them? To investigate this we asked our consultants to document every other month 
the reason for the non-adoption of any of the 38 practices in each plant. To do this consistently 
we developed a flow-chart (Appendix Exhibit 7) which runs through a series of questions to 
understand the root cause for the non-adoption of each practice. The consultants collected this 
data from discussions with owners, managers, and workers, plus their own observations.
As an example of how this flow chart works, imagine a plant that does not record quality defects. 
The consultant would first ask if there was some external constraint, like labor regulations, 
preventing this, which we found never to be the case.27 They would then ask if the plant was 
aware of this practice, which in the example of recording quality typically was the case. The 
consultants would then check if the plant could adopt the practice with the current staff and 
equipment, which again for quality recording systems was always true. Then they would ask 
if the owner believed it would be profitable to record quality defects, which was often the 
constraint on adopting this practice. The owner frequently argued that quality was so good 
they did not need to record quality defects. This view was mistaken, however, because, while 
these plants’ quality might have been good compared to other low-quality Indian textile plants, 
it was very poor by international standards. So, as shown in Figure 3, when they did adopt 
basic quality control practices they substantially improved their production quality. So, in this 
case the reason for non-adoption would be ‘incorrect information’ as the owner appeared to 
have incorrect information on the cost-benefit calculation.
The overall results for non-adoption of management practices are tabulated in Table 4, for the 
treatment plants, control plants and the non-experimental plants. This is tabulated at two-month 
intervals starting the month before the intervention. The rows report the different reasons for 
non-adoption as a percentage of all practices. From the table several results are apparent. First, 
26 About $35 of extra labor to help organize the stock rooms and factory floor, $200 on plastic display boards, $200 for extra yarn 
racking, $1,000 on rewards, and $1,000 for extra computer equipment (this is bought second hand).
27 This does not mean labor regulations do not matter for some practices – for example firing underperforming employees – but they 
did not directly impinge adopt the immediate adoption of the 38 practices. 
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a major initial barrier to the adoption of these practices was a lack of information about their 
existence. About 15 per cent of practices were not adopted because the firms were simply not 
aware of them. These practices tended to be the more advanced practices of regular quality, 
efficiency and inventory review meetings, posting standard-operating procedures and visual aids 
around the factory. Many of these are derived from the Japanese-inspired lean manufacturing 
revolution and are now standard across Europe, Japan and the US.28
Second, another major initial barrier was incorrect information, in that firms had heard of the 
practices but thought they did not apply profitably to them. For example, many of the firms were 
aware of preventive maintenance but few of them thought it was worth doing. They preferred to 
keep their machines in operation until they broke down, and then repair them. This accounted 
for slightly over 45 per cent of the initial non-adoption of practices. 
Third, as the intervention progressed the lack of information constraint was rapidly overcome. 
However, the incorrect information constraints were harder to address. This was because the 
owners had prior beliefs about the efficacy of a practice and it took time to change these. 
This was often done using pilot changes on a few machines in the plant or with evidence from 
other plants in the experiment. For example, the consultants typically started by persuading 
the managers to undertake preventive maintenance on a set of trial machines, and once it was 
proven successful it was rolled out to the rest of the factory. And as the consultants demonstrated 
the positive impact of these initial practice changes, the owners increasingly trusted them and 
would adopt more of the recommendations, like performance incentives for managers.29
Fourth, once the informational constraints were addressed, other constraints arose. For example, 
even if the owners became convinced of the need to adopt a practice, they would often take 
several months to adopt it. A major reason is that the owners were severely time constrained, 
working an average of 68 hours per week already. There was also evidence of procrastination 
in that some owners would defer on taking quick decisions. This matches up with the evidence 
on procrastination in other contexts, for example African farmers investing in fertilizer (Duflo, 
Kremer and Robinson, 2009).
Finally, somewhat surprisingly, we did not find evidence for the direct impact of capital constraints, 
which are a significant obstacle to the expansion of micro-enterprises (eg, De Mel et al., 2008). 
Our evidence suggested that these large firms were not cash-constrained, at least for tangible 
investments. We collected data on all the investments for our 17 firms over the period August 
2008 until August 2010 and found the firms invested a mean (median) of $880,000 ($140,000). 
For example, several of the firms were adding machines or opening new factories, apparently 
often financed by bank loans. Certainly, this scale of investment suggests that investment on the 
scale of $2,000 (the first-year costs of these management changes, ignoring the consultants’ 
fees) is unlikely to be directly impeded by financial constraints.
Of course financial constraints could impede hiring international consultants. The market cost 
of our free consulting would be at least $250,000, and as an intangible investment it would be 
difficult to collateralize. Hence, while financial constraints do not appear to directly block the 
implantation of better management practices, they may hinder firms’ ability to improve their 
management using external consultants. On the other hand, our estimates of the return on hiring 
consultants to improve management practices suggest profitability in just over one year.
28 This ignorance of best practices seems to be common in many developing contexts, for example in pineapple farming in Ghana 
(Conley and Udry, 2010).
29 These sticky priors highlight one reason why management practices appear to change slowly. The anecdotal evidence from 
private equity and consulting is that firms typically need between 18 months to 3 years to execute a turn around. 
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VII.C. How do badly managed firms survive?
We have shown that management matters, with improvements in management practices 
improving plant-level outcomes. One response from economists might then be to argue that 
poor management can at most be a short-run problem, since in the long run better managed 
firms should take over the market. Yet many of our firms have been in business for 20 years 
and more.
One reason why better run firms do not dominate the market is constraints on growth derived 
from limited managerial span of control. In every firm in our sample only members of the owning 
family have positions with major decision-making power over finance, purchasing, operations or 
employment. Non-family members are given only lower-level managerial positions with authority 
only over basic day-to-day activities. The principal reason is that family members do not trust 
non-family members. For example, they are concerned if they let their plant managers procure 
yarn they may do so at inflated rates from friends and receive kick-backs.
A key reason for this inability to decentralize is the poor rule of law in India. Even if directors 
found managers stealing, their ability to successfully prosecute them and recover the assets is 
minimal because of the inefficiency of Indian civil courts. A compounding reason for the inability 
to decentralize in Indian firms is bad management practices, as this means the owners cannot 
keep good track of materials and finance, so may not even able to identify mismanagement 
or theft within their firms.30
As a result of this inability to delegate, firms can expand beyond the size that can be managed 
by a single director only if other family members are available to share directorial duties. Thus, 
an important predictor of firm size was the number of male family members of the owners. In 
particular, the number of brothers and sons of the leading director has a correlation of 0.689 
with the total employment of the firm, compared to a correlation between employment and the 
average management score of 0.223. In fact the best managed firm in our sample had only 
one (large) production plant, in large part because the owner had no brothers or sons to help 
run a larger organization. This matches the ideas of the Lucas (1978) span of control model, 
that there are diminishing returns to how much additional productivity better management 
technology can generate from a single manager. In the Lucas model, the limits to firm growth 
restrict the ability of highly productive firms to drive lower productivity ones from the market. 
In our Indian firms, this span of control restriction is definitely binding, so unproductive firms 
are able to survive because more productive firms cannot expand. 
Entry of new firms into the industry also appears limited by the difficulty of separating ownership 
from control. The supply of new firms is constrained by the number of families with finance 
and male family members available to build and run textile plants. Since other industries in 
India – like software, construction and real estate – are growing rapidly the attractiveness of 
new investment in textile manufacturing is relatively limited (even our firms were often taking 
cash from their textile businesses to invest in other businesses). 
Finally, a 50 per cent tariff on fabric imports insulates Indian textile firms against Chinese 
competition. Hence, the equilibrium appears to be that, with Indian wage rates being extremely 
low, firms can survive with poor management practices. Because spans of control are 
constrained, productive firms are limited from expanding, and so do not drive out badly run 
firms. And because entry is limited new firms do not enter rapidly. The situation approximates 
a Melitz (2003) style model where firms have very high decreasing returns to scale, entry rates 
are low, and initial productivity draws are low (because good management practices are not 
widespread). The resultant equilibrium has a low average level of productivity, a low wage level, 
a low average firm-size, and a large dispersion of firm-level productivities.
30 Another compounding factor is none of these firms had a formalized development or training plan for their managers, and 
managers could not be promoted because only family members could become directors. As a result managers lacked career 
motivation within the firm and were often poorly equipped to take on extra responsibilities. In contrast, Indian software and finance 
firms that have grown management beyond the founding families place a huge emphasis on development and training. (see also 
Banerjee and Duflo (2000)).
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VII.D. Why do firms not use more management consulting?
Finally, why do these firms not hire consultants themselves, given the large gains from better 
management? A primary reason is that these firms are not aware they are badly managed, as 
illustrated in Table 4. Of course consulting firms could still approach firms for business, pointing 
out that their practices were bad and offering to fix them. But Indian firms, much like US firms, 
are bombarded with solicitations from businesses offering to save them money on everything 
from telephone bills to raw materials, and so are unlikely to be receptive. Of course consulting 
firms could go further and offer to provide free advice in return for an ex post profit-sharing deal. 
But monitoring this would be extremely hard, given the firms’ desire to conceal profits from the 
tax authorities. Moreover, the client firm in such an arrangement might worry that the consultant 
would twist its efforts to increase short-term profits at the expense of long-term profits. 
VIII. Conclusions
Management does matter. We implemented a randomized experiment that provided managerial 
consulting services to textile plants in India. This experiment led to improvements in basic 
management practices, with plants adopting lean manufacturing techniques that have been 
standard for decades in the developed world. These improvements in management practices 
led to improvements in product quality, reductions in inventory and increased efficiency, raising 
profitability and productivity. Firms also delegated more decisions because the improved 
informational flow from adopting modern management practices enabled the owners to reduce 
their oversight of plant operations. At the same time computer use increased, driven by the need 
to collect, process and disseminate data as required by modern management practices.
What are the implications of this for public policy? Certainly we do not want to advocate free 
consulting, given its extremely high cost. But our results do suggest that, first, knowledge 
transference from multinationals would be very helpful. Indeed, many of the consultants working 
for the international consulting firm hired by our project had worked for multinationals in India, 
learning from their manufacturing management processes. Yet a variety of legal, institutional, 
and infrastructure barriers have limited multinational expansion within India. Abolishing tariffs 
could also help, as Indian firms would be driven to improve management practices to survive 
against lower cost imports from countries like China. Second, our results also suggest that a 
weak legal environment has limited the scope for well-managed firms to grow. Improving the legal 
environment should encourage productivity-enhancing reallocation, helping to drive out badly 
managed firms. Finally, our results suggest that firms were not implementing best practices on 
their own because of lack of information and knowledge. This suggests that training programs 
for basic operations management, like inventory and quality control, could be helpful. 
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Table 1: The field experiment sample
All Treatment Control Diff
Mean Median Min Max Mean Mean p-value
Sample sizes:
Number of plants 28 n/a n/a n/a 19 9 n/a
Number of experimental 
plants
20 n/a n/a n/a 14 6 n/a
Number of firms 17 n/a n/a n/a 11 6 n/a
Plants per firm 1.65 2 1 4 1.73 1.5 0.393
Firm/plant sizes:
Employees per firm 273 250 70 500 291 236 0.454
Employees, 
experimental plants
134 132 60 250 144 114 0.161
Hierarchical levels 4.4 4 3 7 4.4 4.4 0.935
Annual sales $m per 
firm
7.45 6 1.4 15.6 7.06 8.37 0.598
Current assets $m  
per firm
12.8 7.9 2.85 44.2 13.3 12.0 0.837
Daily mtrs, experimental 
plants
5,560 5,130 2,260 13,000 5,757 5,091 0.602
Management and plant ages:
BVR Management 
score
2.60 2.61 1.89 3.28 2.50 2.75 0.203
Management adoption 
rates
0.262 0.257 0.079 0.553 0.255 0.288 0.575
Age, experimental plant 
(years)
19.4 16.5 2 46 20.5 16.8 0.662
Performance measures:
Operating efficiency (%) 70.77 72.8 26.2 90.4 70.2 71.99 0.758
Raw materials inventory 
(kg)
59,497 61,198 6,721 149,513 59,222 60,002 0.957
Quality  
(% A-grade fabric)
40.12 34.03 9.88 87.11 39.04 41.76 0.629
Notes: Data provided at the plant and/or firm level depending on availability. Number of plants is the total number 
of textile plants per firm including the non-experimental plants. Number of experimental plants is the total number 
of treatment and control plants. Number of firms is the number of treatment and control firms. Plants per firm 
reports the total number of other textiles plants per firm. Several of these firms have other businesses – for example 
retail units and real-estate arms – which are not included in any of the figures here. Employees per firm reports the 
number of employees across all the textile production plants, the corporate headquarters and sales office. Employees 
per experiment plant reports the number of employees in the experiment plants. Hierarchical levels displays the 
number of reporting levels in the experimental plants – for example a firm with workers reporting to foreman, foreman 
to operations manager, operations manager to the general manager and general manager to the managing director 
would have 4 hierarchical levels. BVR Management score is the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) management score 
for the experiment plants. Management adoption rates are the adoption rates of the management practices listed 
in Table A1 in the experimental plants. Annual sales ($m) and Current assets ($m) are both in 2009 US $million 
values, exchanged at 50 rupees = 1 US Dollar. Daily mtrs, experimental plants reports the daily meters of fabric 
woven in the experiment plants. Note that about 3.5 meters is required for a full suit with jacket and trousers, so the 
mean plant produces enough for about 1600 suits daily. Age of experimental plant (years) reports the age of the 
plant for the experimental plants. Raw materials inventory is the stock of yarn per intervention. Operating efficiency 
is the percentage of the time the machines are producing fabric. Quality (% A-grade fabric) is the percentage of 
fabric each plant defines as A-grade, which is the top quality grade.
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Appendix A: Data
Our estimates for profits and productivity impacts are laid out in Table A5, with the methodology 
outlined below. We calculate the numbers for the median firm.
A. Estimations of profitability and productivity impacts. 
We first generate the estimated impacts on quality, inventory and efficiency. To do this we take 
the Intention to Treat (ITT) numbers from Table 2, which shows a reduction of quality defects 
of 32 per cent (exp(-0.386)-1), a reduction in inventory of 16.4 per cent (exp(-0.179)-1) and an 
increase in output of 5.4 per cent (exp(0.056)-1).
Mending wage bill:
Estimated by recording the total mending hours, which is 71,700 per year on average, times the 
mending wage bill which is 36 rupees (about $0.72) per hour. Since mending is undertaken on 
a piece-wise basis – so defects are repaired individually – a reduction in the severity weighted 
defects should lead to a proportionate reduction in required mending hours. 
Fabric revenue loss from non grade-A fabric:
Waste fabric estimated at 5 per cent in the baseline, arising from cutting out defect areas and 
destroying and/or selling at a discount fabric with unfixable defects. Assume an increase in 
quality leads to a proportionate reduction in waste fabric, and calculate for the median firm 
with sales of $6m per year.
Inventory carrying costs:
Total carrying costs of 22 per cent calculated as interest charges of 15 per cent (average prime 
lending rate of 12 per cent over 2008-2010 plus 3 per cent as firm-size lending premium – see 
for example www.sme.icicibank.com/Business_WCF.aspx?pid), 3 per cent storage costs 
(rent, electricity, manpower and insurance) and 4 per cent costs for physical depreciation and 
obsolescence (yarn rots over time and fashions change). 
Increased profits from higher output 
Increasing output is assumed to lead to an equi-proportionate increase in sales because these 
firms are small in their output markets, but would also increase variable costs of energy and 
raw-materials since the machines would be running. The average ratio of (energy + raw materials 
costs)/sales is 63 per cent, so the profit margin on increased efficiency is 37 per cent.
Labor and capital factor shares:
Labor factor share of 0.58 calculated as total labor costs over total value added using the 
‘wearing apparel’ industry in the most recent (2004-05) year of the Indian Annual Survey of 
industry. Capital factor share defined as 1-labor factor share, based on an assumed constant 
returns to scale production function and perfectly competitive output markets.
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Appendix B: Econometrics
We briefly outline in this section the various econometric procedures we implemented to 
verify the robustness of our results. We first outline the Ibragimov-Mueller procedure and then 
briefly discuss the two permutation tests and refer the reader to the original papers for a more 
detailed discussion. 
The proposed procedure by Ibragimov-Mueller (2009) (IM) is useful for our case where the number 
of entities (firms) is small but the number of observations per entity is large. Their approach can 
be summarized as follows: Implement the estimation method (OLS, IV, ITT) on each treatment 
firm separately and obtain 11 firm-specific estimates. Note that we cannot do this for the 
control firms since there is no within-firm variation for the right hand side for the control firms. 
Therefore the results from this procedure are essentially based on before-after comparisons 
for the treatment firms, after using the control firms to remove time period effects.
The procedure requires that the coefficient estimates from each entity are asymptotically 
independent and Gaussian (but can have different variances). In our case this would be justified 
by an asymptotics in T argument (recall we have about 110 observations per plant). In particular, 
we can be agnostic about the exact structure of correlations between observations within a firm 
as long as the parameter estimators satisfy a central limit theorem. Subject to this requirement, 
the extent of correlation across observations within an entity is unrestricted. In addition, different 
correlation structures across firms are permissible since the procedure allows for different 
variances for each firm level parameter. This ‘asymptotic heterogeneity’ considerably relaxes the 
usual assumptions made in standard panel data contexts (such as those underlying the cluster 
covariance matrices in our main tables). Finally, IM show that the limiting standard Gaussian 
distribution assumption (for each firm) can be relaxed to accommodate heterogeneous scale 
mixtures of standard normal distributions as well.  
We next summarize the ideas underlying the permutation based tests. We first describe 
the permutation test for the ITT parameter. We base the test on the Wei-Lachin statistic as 
described in Greevy et al (2004). The reason for using this statistic is that the permutation test 
for the IV parameter is a generalization of this procedure and so it is natural to consider this 
procedure in the first step. Consider the vector of outcomes {Yi,t}
T
t=1 for plant i (we examine 
each outcome separately). Define the binary random assignment variable for firm i. Define the 
random variable 
qi,j,t = II (Zi > Zj (II (Yi,t > Yj,t) - (Yi,t < Yj,t))
This variable takes on the values 0, 1 and -1. It is equal to zero if plant  is a control or plant j is 
a treatment plant and any of the outcome variables for either plant is missing. It is equal to +1 if 
plant i is a treatment plant, plant j is a control and the outcome for i is larger than the outcome 
for j. It is equal to -1 if plant i is a treatment plant, plant j is a control and the outcome for i is 
smaller than the outcome for j. The Wei-Lachin statistic can be written as 
T = ΣZiqi  = Σ Zi Σ Σ qi,j,t 
Under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, the treatment outcomes should not be 
systematically larger than the control outcomes. Specifically, under the null hypothesis and 
conditional upon the order statistics, each possible candidate value of T has an equal probability 
of occurring. We use this insight to construct a critical value for the test. Consider one of the (1711) 
combinations of the firm treatment assignment variable Z. For each such permutation, compute 
T. Form the empirical distribution of T by considering all possible permutations and record the 
appropriate quantile for the distribution of T thus generated (in the one-sided alternative case 
this would be the 1−a quantile). Finally, reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect if the 
original statistic T exceeds this quantile. Greevy et al (2004), show that this test has exact size 
a for any sample size n. Therefore, the conclusions of this test do not rely upon any asymptotic 
theory. Instead, the results lean heavily on the idea of exchangeability – the property that 
 N N T N
 i=1 i=1 t=1 j=1
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changing the ordering of a sequence of random variables does not affect their joint distribution. 
For our application, this notion seems reasonable. Note that exchangeability is weaker than 
the i.i.d. assumption so for instance outcomes across firms can even be correlated (as long 
as they are equi-correlated). 
Consider next the randomization inference based test for the IV case. We first consider the 
cross-section. Define the counterfactual model for outcomes Yd = τ + bd + e and let Dj denote 
potential treatment status when treatment assignment is j. Define observed treatment status 
as D = ZD1 + (1 - Z)D0. In our case, the treatment status is the fraction of the 38 practices 
that the firm has implemented. The maintained assumption is that the potential outcomes are 
independent of the instrument Z or equivalently (e, D1, D0) is independent of Z and the error term 
has mean 0. We observe a random sample on (D, Z, YD) and wish to test the null hypothesis 
H : b = b0  against the two-sided alternative. Note that under the null hypothesis, Y ≡ Y - τ - b0D 
= e  is independent of Z and we use this fact to construct a test along the lines of the previous 
test. Consider the analogue of the first equation
qi,j,t = II (Zi > Zj (II (Yi,t > Yj,t) - (Yi,t < Yj,t))
Where we have replaced the response  by the response subtracted by . Note that  is consistently 
estimable under the null, so without loss of generality we can treat it as known. For our data, 
we modify this approach to allow for a panel and covariates (time and plant dummies). This 
parallels the proposal in Andrews and Marmer (2008) and we can define
Yi,t  =  Yj,t - b0Di,t  - X’i,tδ 
and we form the statistic as 
     
Where
qi,j,t = II (Zi > Zj (II (Yi,t > Yj,t) - (Yi,t < Yj,t))
For each candidate value of b, we form {Yi,t}i,t and carry out the permutation test (as described 
in the ITT case above and noting that we do not use pre-treatment outcomes). We collect the 
set of values for which we could not reject the null hypothesis (against the two-sided alternative 
at a=.05) to construct an exact confidence set for b. Although the confidence set constructed 
in this manner need not be a single interval, in all our estimations, the confidence sets were 
single intervals.
 N N T N
 i=1 i=1 t=1 j=1
T = ΣZiqi  = Σ Zi Σ Σ qi,j,t 
∼
∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
∼ ∼
∼
∼∼ ∼ ∼
ˆ
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Table A3: The computerization survey:
Question C1: ‘Does the plant have an Electronic resource planning system?’
Question C2: ‘How many computers does the plant have?’ 
Question C3: ‘How many of these computers are less than two years old’
Question C4: ‘How many people in the factory typically use computers for at least  
ten minutes day?’ 
Question C5: ‘How many cumulative hours per week are computers used in  
the plant’?
Question C6: ‘Does the plant have an internet connection’
Question C7: ‘Does the plant manager use email (for work purposes)?’
Question C8: ‘Does the plant manager use email (for work purposes)?’
Question C9: ‘What is the extent of computer use in operational performance 
management?’ (and score from 1 to 5 is possible, but scores given for 1, 3, and 5)
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Scoring grid:
Computers not 
used in operational 
performance 
management
Around 50% 
of operational 
performance metrics 
(efficiency, inventory, 
quality and output) 
are tracked and 
analyzed through 
computer/ERP 
generated reports.
All main operational 
performance metrics 
(efficiency, inventory, 
quality and output) 
are tracked and 
analyzed through 
computer/ERP 
generated reports. 
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Table A5: Estimated median impact of improved quality, inventory and efficiency
Change Impact Estimation approach Estimated 
impact
Profits (annual in $) 
Improvement in quality
 
Reduction in repair 
manpower
 
Reduction in defects 
(32%) times median 
mending manpower wage 
bill ($41,000).
 
$13,000
Reduction in waste 
fabric
Reduction in defects 
(32%) times the average 
yearly waste fabric (5%) 
times median average 
sales ($6m).
$96,000
Reduction in inventory Reduction in 
inventory carrying 
costs
Reduction in inventory 
(16.4%) times carrying 
cost of inventory (22%) 
times median inventory 
($230,000)
$8,000
Increased efficiency Increased sales Increase in output (5.4%) 
times margin on sales 
(37% ) times median  
sales ($6m)
$121,000
Total $238,000
Productivity (%) 
Improvement in quality
 
Reduction in repair 
manpower
 
Reduction in defects 
(32%) times share of 
repair manpower in total 
manpower (18.7%) times 
labor share (0.58) in 
output in textiles (from the 
2003-04 Indian Annual 
Survey of Industries.)
 
3.5%
Reduction in waste 
fabric
Reduction in defects 
(31.9%) times the average 
yearly waste fabric (5%) 
1.6%
Reduction in inventory Reduction in capital 
stock 
Reduction in inventory 
(16.4%) times inventory 
share in capital (8%) times 
capital factor share in 
output in textiles (0.42)
0.6%
Increased efficiency Increased output Increase in output (5.4%) 
without any change in 
labor or capital
5.4%
Total 11.1%
Notes: Estimated impact of the improvements in the management intervention on firms’ profitability and 
productivity through quality, inventory and efficiency using the estimates in Table 2. Figure calculated 
for the median firm. See Appendix A for details of calculations for inventory carrying costs, fabric waste, 
repair manpower and factor shares.
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Exhibit 1: Plants are large compounds, often containing several buildings
Plant entrance with gates and a guard post Plant surrounded by grounds
Front entrance to the main building Plant buildings with gates and guard post
Exhibit 2: These factories operate 24 hours a day for seven days a week producing 
fabric from yarn, with four main stages of production
(1) Winding the yarn thread onto the warp beam (2) Drawing the warp beam ready for weaving
(3) Weaving the fabric on the weaving loom (4) Quality checking and repair
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Exhibit 3: Many parts of these factories were dirty and unsafe
Garbage outside the factory Garbage inside a factory
Flammable garbage in a factory Chemicals without any covering
Exhibit 4: The factory floors were frequently disorganized
Instrument not 
removed after 
use, blocking 
hallway.
Tools left 
on the 
floor after 
use
Dirty and 
poorly 
maintained 
machines
Old warp 
beam, chairs 
and a desk 
obstructing the 
factory floor
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Exhibit 5: Most plants had months of excess yarn, usually spread across multiple 
locations, often without any rigorous storage system
Yarn without 
labeling, order or 
damp protection
Crushed yarn 
cones (which 
need to be 
rewound on a 
new cone) from 
poor storage
Yarn piled up so 
high and deep 
that access to 
back sacks is 
almost impossible
Different types 
and colors of 
yarn lying mixed
Exhibit 6: The parts stores were often disorganized and dirty
Spares without any labeling No protection to prevent damage and rust
Spares without any labeling or order Shelves overfilled and disorganized
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Was the firm previously aware 
that the practice existed? 
Lack of information 
Can the firm adopt the practice 
with existing staff and 
equipment? 
Did the owner believe 
introducing the practice would 
be profitable? 
Owner lack of time, low 
ability or 
procrastination 
Does the firm have enough 
internal financing or access to 
credit?   
Do you think the CEO was 
correct about the cost-benefit 
tradeoff? 
Could the firm hire 
new employees or 
consultants to adopt 
the practice? 
Credit constraints 
External factors (legal, climate 
etc) 
Is the reason for the non 
adoption of the practice internal 
to the firm? 
Could the CEO get his 
employees to introduce the 
practice? 
Did the firm 
realize this 
would be 
profitable?  
Would this adoption 
be profitable Not profit maximizing 
Incorrect information 
Lack of local skills 
Other reasons 
Yes 
No 
Legend 
Conclusion 
Hypothesis 
No 
Yes 
Notes: The consultants used the flow chart to evaluate why each particular practice from the list of 38 
in Table 2 had not been adopted in each firm, on a bi-monthly basis. Non adoption was monitored every 
other month based on discussions with the firms’ directors, managers, workers, plus regular consulting 
work in the factories.
Exhibit 7: Non adoption flow chart used by consultants to collect data
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